Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is a new approach to the conceptualization and measurement of democracy. It is co-hosted by the University of Gothenburg and University of Notre Dame. With a V-Dem Institute at University of Gothenburg that comprises almost ten staff members, and a project team across the world with four Principal Investigators, fifteen Project Managers, 30+ Regional Managers, 170 Country Coordinators, Research Assistants, and 2,500 Country Experts, the V-Dem project is one of the largest-ever social science research-oriented data collection programs.
Introduction
There are many different views on what democracy is, or ought to be. Yet, a common institutional denominator for modern democracy is elections. This is, in part, a consequence of the impracticalities of direct democracy in larger polities (Madison 1961 (Madison /1789 Jefferson 1935: 83; Mill 1958: 212-18) . Elections have become the institutional key to the modern actualization of the essence of democracy: rule of the people by the people through representative government. Every modern definition of representative democracy includes contested elections as the fundamental legitimate procedure for the translation of rule by the people into workable executive and legislative power. Now that this is more-or-less universally acknowledged, the post-Cold-War period has seen the emergence of authoritarian regimes that imitate democratic procedures without embracing their full substance. This has sparked a very different debate, which at the same time is highly consequential in terms of its policy relevance. Do elections have a causal democratizing effect, or do they, on the contrary, stabilize autocratic rule? In other words, should elections be supported as a means of democratization, or does the nearly uniform endorsement of de jure multiparty elections provide both the justification and the means for autocrats to cling to power?
A number of prominent scholars in the discipline have vigorously argued both sides of the argument, thus justifying more expansive and comprehensive testing. This paper tests the competing arguments at a global as well as regional levels and over varying time periods from 1900 to 2012. We use the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (version 4.3) , the most comprehensive dataset on democracy ever produced (Coppedge et al. 2015b ). We find strong evidence that reiterated multiparty elections brings improvement in the democratic qualities of polities both globally and in many regions of the world. In terms of variation over time we find that the democratizing effect of elections is a relatively new phenomenon. It becomes salient during the Cold War, but has the strongest effect throughout the "third wave of democratization" or 1974 to present. Our findings also suggest some regional discrepancies. Both sub-Saharan Africa and post-Communist Eurasia show the strongest evidence of democratization by elections. Meanwhile, elections have little or no impact on civil liberties and rule of law in Asia. The results are robust to many alternative specifications including variation in sample, dependent variable, and means of estimation. As a result, they provide strong evidence in support of the democratizing effect of elections. The conclusions from this have implications for both policy and future research on democratization.
The Ambiguity of the Meaning of Elections for the Study of Regimes
Scholars of democratization have long wrestled with the relationship between elections and democracy. In his triumphal account of the third wave of democracy, Huntington proclaims, "Elections, open, free, and fair, are the essence of democracy, the sine qua non." (1991: 9) . Founding elections have often been highlighted as the end point of democratic transition, when democratically elected governments replaced authoritarian regimes (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986 , Mainwaring 1992 , Bogdanor 1990 ). Such buoyant electoral optimism has been reeled in by calls to avoid engaging in the "fallacy of electoralism," or the error of identifying competitive elections as a sufficient condition for defining democracy (Karl 1990, Schmitter and Karl, 1991) . In response, Linz and Stepan remind us that while elections are not sufficient for democracy, they are surely necessary to it (1996: 2). Przeworski (1991) adds a further caveat, pointing out that from a definitional perspective, the loser matters even more than the winner: "Democracies are systems in which parties lose elections." (10).
While academics try to make sense of the new order where a majority of states are at least minimally democratic, authoritarian leaders beset by new challenges to their authority, have come to fear that perhaps democracy is in fact becoming "the only game in town" (Linz and Stepan 1996: 8) . Rather than becoming exemplars of this new spirit, autocrats try to rewrite the rules of the game. This new game is but a simulacrum of democracy, in which the kind of institutionalized uncertainty highlighted by Przeworski (1991) is subdued or at least caged. Some authoritarian incumbents learn to secure enough compliance from voters with a minimum of visible manipulation in order to dupe donors that things are heading in the democratic direction (Schedler 2009 ), while holding onto power with little risk of having to step down.
For a while the discipline played around with a range of different concepts -hybrid regime (Diamond 2002) , semi-democracy (Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995) , semiauthoritarianism (Ottaway 2003) , or even notions with elusive real-world referents like "anocracy" (Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, Kristensen, and O'Halloran 2006) .
2 Schedler (2006) and Levitsky and Way (2010) resolved the ambiguity inherent in such terms when they argued that elections and even competitive elections are definitional components of not only democracies, 2 "Anocracy" is a particularly cringe-worthy neologism. It is essentially the same word as anarchy with its original Greek parts replaced with aftermarket Latin parts. The word anarchy comes to English via Latin from the Greek word anarkhos (rulerless) [an-(without) + arkhos (leader)]. Anocracy attaches that the Greek negative prefix an-on the Latin root -cracy (rule, though derived from the original Greek -kratos). How the absence of rule came to be associated with a form a rule is testimony to the powers of contemporary English to carry meaning in an extremely flexible fashion.
but of newly emergent forms of authoritarianism as well. 3 What differentiates competitive elections under authoritarianism is that the "playing field" is not level (or at least not as level as under democracy) and that loss by the incumbent while not precluded certainly has a lower expected probability than under democracy. This opens up a whole new perspective on regimes and regime transitions. Democratic simulation by authoritarian regimes is perhaps not a sign of democratization, but a form of adaptation making authoritarianism more durable in an era of near-hegemonic democratic enthusiasm.
From Definitional to Causal
Even though things have become more complicated definitionally, they have also regimes might benefit from holding elections, specifically how they might stabilize authoritarian rule. Schedler (2006) was among the first to point out that the ability to hold elections and reap the legitimacy benefits they convey without much risk of relinquishing office is a net gain for authoritarian leaders. Greene (2007) argues that authoritarian one-party developmental states stabilize their regimes by using patronage from public resources to hold and win elections without resorting to high levels of fraud or repression.
Others focus less on the direct salutary effects of elections on authoritarian regimes, instead looking at how their outcome -elected legislatures -help to produce authoritarian stability. Przeworski and Gandhi (2007) Kaya and Bernhard, 2013) . The validity of the causal mechanism for the Middle East and North Africa has also been questioned (Lust-Okar, 2009 (Morse, 2015) . More generally, the third wave brought an initial burst of optimistic scholarship voicing hopes for a "second liberation" (Ayittey 1992, Hyden and Bratton 1992) .
This soon turned into doubts about whether these transitions represented "real" change (Carothers 1997 , Josep, 1998 . While scholars like Bratton (1998) argue that Africa has returned to neopatrimonial politics, others see a continuation of disorder and destructive politics (Chabal and Daloz 1999) , no change at all (Akinrinade 1998) , political closure (Joseph 1998) , semiauthoritarianism (Carothers 1997) , or elections without democracy (van de Walle 2002) .
The literature on authoritarian regime survival and replacement also presents evidence that is somewhat supportive of the idea of democratization by elections. Brownlee (2009) provides a contingent set of global findings, which generally point in the direction of the salutary effects of multiparty elections under authoritarianism for long-term democratic outcomes. His models show that while breakdown in both multiparty and other forms of authoritarianism occur at similar rates, when the former breakdown, they have a much higher propensity to become democratic (Brownlee 2009) . Svolik (2012) A second set of studies take the debate further by focusing on elections as junctures of enhanced threat to authoritarian regimes due to the greater uncertainty that they provoke.
Howard and Roessler (2006) 
Framing a More Definitive Set of Tests
Competitive multiparty elections are thus now accepted as a defining characteristic of both democracy and competitive authoritarianism. For a large swath of the discipline this serves to address the teleological bias in the problem of never-ending transitions (Carothers, 2002) , though this is much more inherent to the policy community rather than academic circles.
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Much of the research outlined above developed as a product of post-Cold-War politics, a period when discredited dictatorial alternatives incorporated multi-party elections into authoritarian systems on a scale not seen before. Previously no-party or one-party states faced pressures to open their political systems to political competition, especially those reliant on the West for developmental or financial assistance (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997, Dunning 2004 ).
Yet, many incumbent authoritarian leaders did not relinquish power but instead tried to manage the change.
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The research that we discuss above has conceptualized these developments in two radically different ways. For Schedler, Gandhi and Przeworski, Levitsky and Way, and those who followed them, multiparty elections are an adaptation by authoritarian incumbents facing a new a set of global realities. The successful navigation of the dilemma of allowing opposition to contest elections (or the existence of representative institutions within an authoritarian framework) led to more robust and adaptable forms of authoritarianism. For the other set of authors, the emergence of multiparty elections in authoritarian states, represents a new mode of transition to democracy. Lindberg (2006 Lindberg ( , 2009 ) presents this as a protracted process where there is not a founding democratic election that punctuates a radical break between authoritarianism and democratic episodes. Reiterated elections lead to a strengthening of core democratic elements such as competition and the protection of the civil liberties, both of which are necessary to democracy. For those who theorize about the Color Revolutions, the extrication from communism did not result in democracy (though there is some ambiguity about whether these are "frozen" or "incomplete" transitions or forms of neo-authoritarianism). However, the continued holding of elections opens up periodic opportunities for the democratic opposition to press their grievances vis-à-vis the authoritarian incumbent.
In this paper, we assess which of these theories has greater traction. Specifically we test if reiterated multiparty elections lead to an increase in the quality of democracy over time.
Should we fail to find this it would suggest that they serve to promote an authoritarian status quo. It provides the most comprehensive test to date in terms of temporal and spatial coverage. 
Research Design Sample
We test for the democratizing effect of multiparty elections in 2,032 election cycles in 156 countries from 1900 to 2012. We also run regressions on regional samples for Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Postcommunist Eurasia, and we split samples along different time periods. Our unit of analysis varies by specification and includes both country-election-cycles and country-years for robustness. The largest model (global sample, country-year observations) includes 9,857 country-years.
Dependent Variable
The outcome of interest in our case is not transition to or level of democracy per se but movement towards democracy. In order to avoid tautology, we focus on processes of liberalization in key dimensions essential to democracy but distinct from elections. The rationale is that political systems already allowing multiparty elections will be differentiable into democracies and competitive authoritarian regimes by the degree to which they are strictly governed by law and the extent to which the state respects formal civil liberties. Where the playing field is uneven, we would expect incumbents to enforce the law unevenly, explicitly to their political advantage, and to disadvantage the opposition by periodically violating their basic civil rights. We constructed an index variable combining 18 indicators from the V-Dem data that capture rule of law and civil liberties using point estimates (Coppedge M. , et al., 2015b) . The data originates from ratings provided by over 2,500 country experts. Each country-year is typically coded by a minimum of five experts aggregated to country-year ratings by a Bayesian latent-variable measurement model described in Pemstein et al. (2015) . Our index is drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model (see Appendix A1 for the variables used to compile this index).
This scale of liberalization ranges from 0 to 1 and serves as our main dependent variable. Higher values on this scale indicate a higher degree of rule of law and greater civil liberties.
Main Independent Variable
The independent variable is the number of de jure multiparty elections held -Dem variables. The dataset provides a coding of electoral regimes and their interruptions (v2x_elecreg). It also includes coding for whether the number of parties that participated in each election (Coppedge et al., 2015a) . 7 Each count restarts from zero after a breakdown of the electoral regime. A break in multiparty electoral sequences is triggered either by an interruption in electoral regime (v2x_elecreg) or a change from multiparty elections. Because the V-Dem data only includes elections after 1900, we identified and coded all earlier election years using historical records. In total, thirty-seven countries had electoral sequences beginning prior to 1900, with the oldest beginning in the United States in 1788. To control for differences in system of government, we only count executive elections in those systems where the executive is directly elected. For systems where only the parliament is directly elected, we count elections for the legislature only (lower chamber for bicameral parliaments). For the sample included in our main models, the number of successive uninterrupted multiparty elections ranges from 0 to 57.
Our main hypothesis is that the reiteration of elections leads to increases in the quality of democracy. Countries hold elections at different intervals and one might object that this should be accounted for. For example, the United States and Argentina hold mid-term elections to their legislatures and other countries have different term-lengths for executive and legislative office.
The empirical implications of the theory we are testing, however, is that each additional election should produce positive, democratizing effects regardless of this. If the mechanism in part at least, is socialization and experiential learning where opposition parties become better at coordination, campaigning, and countering fraud; citizens learn to expect more and better rights Thus we model our tests using a diminishing returns assumption by a linear-log function.
Ten percent of the observations are the first election cycles that technically speaking have a zero count of successive multiparty elections. We therefore add one to each of the zero values (x+1, where x=0). Following advice from Shadden and Zorn (2011), we then include a dummy variable to control for election cycles that were originally zeros. As a robustness check, we also include a linear model with and without long-standing, high quality democracies for our global tests. A long-standing democracy is considered any state that survives three uninterrupted election cycles at or above a score of 0.75 on the V-Dem polyarchy scale. Countries that meet this criteria drop from the data until they score below 0.75, at which time they reenter until they meet the three democratic elections criteria again.
Control Variables
We include four likely confounders as control variables in our models. We control for the level of development using the natural log of per capita GDP (2005 GK$) from the previous year. To measure regime performance, we include per capita GDP growth from the previous year. Both GDP and GDP growth are measured using the estimates by Rosling, Rönnlund, and Rosling (2015) . To control for oil rents, we include the previous year's oil production per capita (100,000 metric tons) based on estimates in Wimmer and Min (2006) and Ross (2013) . Finally, in all random effects models, we include a control variable for the level of ethnic fractionalization as measured by Fearon and Laitin (2003) . We do not include it in the fixed effects models because it is time invariant. In some of our robustness checks, we also include a time variant measure of ethnic fractionalization, developed from the CREG dataset (Nardulli et al. 2102 ). This measure, however, only covers the post-WWII period and thus is not included in our main models.
Estimation Techniques
We estimate cross-sectional time series models with both fixed and random effects. The primary unit of analysis is the country-election-period. We exclude observations where the country is not independent, but include pre-independence elections where they are considered integral (as coded in the V-Dem dataset) in the election count-variable. We estimate models The model can be summarized as:
where ! !"!! are control variables,
is the number of successive multiparty elections, and We begin by estimating global models using all countries since 1900. These models include year fixed-effects and country-effects, both random and fixed. Then we run split-sample models by historical time period using fixed country-effects. We are particularly interested in how the effect of elections varies during the pre-Cold War, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods. We also address the importance of the third wave of democratization (1974-present) by splitting the sample of Cold War years into pre-and post-third wave models. Finally, to replicate and expand previous work in specific regions, we estimate separate fixed effects models for the entire time period and the third-wave period for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC), Asia, and Post-Communist countries (PC). We do not report regional models for long-standing democratic countries (includes Western/Southern Europe, North America, New Zealand, and Australia). Estimations suggest that, as anticipated, elections are relatively unimportant for this group of consolidated democracies. They nevertheless are included in the global sample. We also conduct robustness tests using models specified with country-years, using the Freedom House civil liberties score as the outcome variable, and controlling for time-variant ethnic-fractionalization using the CREG dataset (Nardulli et al. 2012) . This allows us to compare our findings to results presented in previous studies using this unit of analysis, outcome variable, and control variable. Table 1 presents results for the main models using the full global sample (all regions and all time). We run both fixed (1.1 and 1.2) and random country-effects (1.3 and 1.4). We present models using election periods (1.1 and 1.3) and country-years (1.2 and 1.4) as the unit of analysis.
Results

Global Sample
These models also control for year fixed-effects. Generally, the results are similar across specifications. All else being equal, when the number of successive multiparty elections doubles, the level of civil liberties and rule of law is expected to increase by 0.01 points (on a scale that runs from 0-1). This suggests that elections have a modest (but robust) impact on the democratic qualities of countries holding elections.
The control variables largely perform as expected. The sign on the dummy variable controlling for zero multiparty elections (to control for the transformation of the zeroes to ones for the logistic transformation as suggested by Shadden and Zorn 2011) is negative, indicating that the level of protection of civil liberties and rule of law is lower prior to the holding of the first multiparty election. The log of GDP per capita is positively associated with democratic quality, but only for the random effects models. Oil production per capita, as a proxy for the negative association of the resource curse with democracy is negative and significant in electioncycle models as expected. Ethnic fractionalization (only for the RE models because the indicator in time invariant) is insignificant. Economic growth is negative, but insignificant. While this would be counterintuitive for regime survival models, we attribute this to the notion that regimes under threat of diminished support due to economic contraction, are more likely to use repressive measures thus leading to weaker protection of rule of law and civil liberties.
As a robustness check of our model specification, we also run linear models with and without long-standing democracies. We model this relationship by rescaling the outcome variable to a 0 (low) to 100 (high). This eases interpretation of coefficients that would otherwise be very small. The results reported in Table A2 of the appendix suggest that the linear-log specification better models the behavior of the observed relationship without requiring the omission of long-standing democracies. This is evidenced by the fact that the strength of the correlation between the number of elections and the civil liberties and rule of law score increases when long-standing democracies are omitted from the sample. However, the key outcome variable is only significant for the linear model using random country-effects and fixed year effects with long-standing democracies omitted. Given the robustness of the effect of elections when using the linear-log estimation and the general theoretical rationale for doing so, it appears that the linear model fits poorly.
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Variation over Time
The literature suggests, however, that the effect of elections on democratization could be temporally bounded, particularly to the post-Cold War or third wave periods. To test this hypothesis, we present split sample models in Table 2 . We estimate fixed effects models for the do not include year fixed effects for these models due to concerns regarding the increased likelihood of biased estimates due to a large number of parameters and a small number of observations per country. Furthermore, substantively, we engage in this split sampling to gauge time effects on the basis of periodization.
The coefficient for elections during the pre-Cold War period is consistent with the full model (1.1), but fails to meet conventional levels of statistical significance (p>0.2). During the Cold War, elections have a positive, significant impact that is about 100 percent larger than the pre-Cold War period. However, this effect is primarily driven by the third wave of democratization. All else being equal, during the 14 years that the third wave overlaps with the Cold War, every time the number of successive multiparty elections doubled, the expected level of civil liberties and rule of law increased by about 0.08 on the 0 to 1 index scale. When we take into account the entire third wave period, this effect is reduced by 27%.
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Perhaps a more intuitive way to think about this is in terms of the number of elections, all else being equal, it would take for a country to move from one extreme to the other on the civil liberties and rule of law scale. 
Figure 2. Predictions Across Historical Periods
The findings are robust when controlling for a time-variant measure of ethnic fractionalization, when using country random effects, and when including the Freedom House civil liberties score as the outcome variable. In order to include ethnic fractionalization in our fixed-effects models, we compute a time variant fractionalization measure based on Alesina et al.
(2003) using the CREG dataset (Nardulli et al. 2012 ). Similar to Fearon and Laitin's measure which is used for the random effects models, this measure estimates the odds that any two randomly selected individuals within a country will be of the same ethnicity. In Table A3 of the Appendix, we replicate our historical sample tests while including this control variable. Because the CREG dataset only covers 1946 to 2012, the ethnic fractionalization score is omitted from the pre-1946 sub-sample model. The results suggest that controlling for ethnic fractionalization has little impact on the outcome or the overall findings regarding the effect of elections. Table   A4 in the Appendix reports results from historical period models when using random rather than fixed country effects. For these models, we use Fearon and Laitin's measure of ethnic fractionalization because of its greater coverage years. These results are also consistent with findings when using fixed effects estimation.
Finally, we test whether the results hold when using Freedom House civil liberties score rather than the V-Dem data. First, we transform the Freedom House civil liberties score into a 0-1 scale, with higher numbers indicating higher levels of democracy. This allows for comparison between the V-Dem index and the highly popular Freedom House score. As shown in Table A5 of the Appendix, results for the country fixed and random effects models suggests that the findings for the third wave period are quite similar when using the Freedom House civil liberties score as the outcome. The only major difference in the findings is that elections are only significant at the p<0.10 level when using the fixed effects estimation for the Cold War period.
Regional Variation
The models above suggest that the onset of the third wave had an important impact on how successive uninterrupted sequences of multiparty elections affect the democratic qualities of electoral regimes. In Table 3 , we test for whether this finding holds in the key geographic regions encompassed by the third wave. The results reported use fixed effects estimations with both the election-cycle and country-year as the unit of analysis. We report the findings for each region using the Freedom House civil liberties scores during the third wave as an alternative outcome variable as this was the dependent variable used some of the extant regional studies.
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The models show that elections have a positive influence on democratization in several, but not all, regions affected by the third wave.
11 The Freedom House data begin in 1973, one year prior to the onset of the third wave, so they add the full sample. Thus full sample estimations do not lead to any substantive changes and are omitted.
For sub-Saharan Africa, the finding is robust for all eight specifications, regardless of whether they are election-cycle or country-year, third wave or not. For the Post-Communist states, the results suggest that multiparty elections have a democratizing effect only during the third wave. This contrasts with Latin America, where the full sample is significant at the p<0.05 level but loses significance (p<0.12) for the third wave for the V-Dem based dependent variable using election cycle as the unit of analysis. The former is interesting in that US foreign policy towards authoritarian regimes in Latin America became less supportive beginning in 1976 with the Carter administration's focus on human rights policy. These results, however, are not robust using the Freedom House civil liberties indicator as the outcome variable or when using the country-year as the unit of analysis for the V-Dem indicator. Finally, the evidence from MENA and Asia show little to no support for the hypothesis that reiterated multiparty competitive elections lead to an improvement in democratic qualities. When using the election-cycle specification, countries in MENA experience increased democracy with more elections, but only at the 90% confidence level. This becomes insignificant in country-year and Freedom House models. In Asia, the election count variable is never significant.
As a robustness check, we also ran the same models using random rather than fixed effects. Table A6 given the earlier findings of Kaya and Bernhard (2013) . However, their models use very different specifications, which take into account such things as voting turnout and strength of opposition, which they were using to test a broader range of actor-centered behavior contingent theories growing out the literature on the Color Revolutions as well as the democratizing power of elections-hypothesis. However, the fixed effect models that we run here should preferably not be overburdened with controls since inclusion of too many variables can lead to hiding real effects (Achen 2005 , Schrodt 2014 . With the more parsimonious models here, the democratizing power of elections-hypothesis is consistently supported by empirical evidence.
The regional perspective adds further insights on the global findings. Quite clearly they are driven by some regions more than others. Asia particularly seems less prone to the democratizing effect of elections, whereas Africa and postcommunist Eurasia seem to account for the bulk of the global effect. The results for Latin America and the Middle East/North Africa fall somewhat ambiguously in the middle.
Conclusions
The wide emergence of new forms of authoritarianism reliant on competitive multiparty elections in the period following the Cold War shook up the discipline's earlier assumptions about their role of in defining regime types. The necessity of relaxing those assumptions to make sense of competitive electoral forms of authoritarianism also meant that we needed to examine our assumptions about the ways in which countries democratize. This paper investigates whether an increasing number of multiparty competitive elections in uninterrupted sequence is associated positively with increased protection of civil liberties and the rule of law in a variety of global and regional samples over several different time periods. Overall, we produce substantial and robust findings that this is the case.
First, we show that this relationship holds over a global sample for the period 1900-2012, something only barely hinted at in the previous literature on level of democracy (Teorell and Hadenius 2009 ). This finding is highly congruent with Miller's findings on how multiparty elections are conducive to democratic transition using an event-history approach with a binary indicator, as opposed to our quality of democracy approach (2015) . Second, we show that the effect is enhanced in certain time periods. The effect is clearly strongest during the third wave of democratization and in the post-Cold-War period. What is most interesting is that the adaptive behavior of authoritarian incumbents to a historical period of unprecedented democratic Zeitgeist was not completely effective in blunting their vulnerability to popular democratic challenges (Svolik, 2012) . In their quest to remain in power by simulating democracy, they (albeit unintentionally) created a new evolutionary path to democratization through reiterated multiparty competitive elections.
Finally, we shed light on the extant regional findings which created doubt about how far the democratization through elections thesis travelled geographically. We show that the effect is most pronounced in Africa and postcommunist Eurasia. We also turn up less robust evidence of similar but much less substantial effects in Latin America as well as the Middle East and North
Africa. The only region encompassed by the third wave that we do not turn up evidence for is Asia. The question of why the effect is more prominent in some areas rather than others is a compelling question, but one that must be taken up by subsequent research. All in all we can more definitely conclude that democratization through elections is not a case of African exceptionalism but a more global phenomenon. This opens up a range of intriguing new questions in untangling and explaining the temporal and regional differences we have uncovered.
! ! !
